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SEE I'. SUPERIOR COURT
(55 C.2d 279; 10 Ca1.Rptr. 63 •• 359 P.2d 321

[L. A. No. 26110.
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In Bunk. Feb. 3, 1961.]

DORIS S. SEE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; CHARTJES B.
SEE, Real Party in J nterest.
[1] Divorce-Temporary Alimony.-Under Civ. Code, §§ 137.2,

137.3, authorizing temporary alimony and suit money "during
the pendency of any action for divorce or separate maintenance," temporary relief, such as temporary alimony, child
support and suit money, may be granted in a proceeding to
vacate parts of a final divorce decree incorporating a property
settlement agreement, such proceeding being an attack on
the divorce decree, and it is immaterinl that the decree is attacked only with respect to its property provisions and that
the attack is by an independent action rather than by motion
in the divorce proceedings.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County to hear motions for temporary alimony,
child support and suit money. Writ granted.
Wright, Wright, Goldwater & Mack, John H. Rice, George I.
Devor and Justin Gray for Petitioner.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, William E. Lamoreaux, Assistant County Counsel, and Donald K. Byrne,
Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
Crowley & Rhoden and Harold Rhoden for Real Party in
Interest.
TRAYNOR, J.-Doris S. See and Charles See were married
in 1942 and divorced in 1960. On March 14, 1959, they
executed an integrated property settlement agreement dividing their property and providing for child support and
monthly payments in lieu of alimony. The agreement was incorporated in the interlocutory decree. The final decree was
entered on April 27, 1960. On Junc 27, 1960, Doris filed an
amended complaint in an independent suit in equity to vacate
the parts of the decree incorporating the agreement. She
also sought temporary alimony, child support, and suit money.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 171 et seq.
Melt. Dig. Reference: [1] Divorce, §175.
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The trial eonrt denied the h'lllporal',\' relief on the ground that
it had no pow('r to make the orders rNjlH'sted. Doris seeks a
writ of mandate to the trial court to hear her motions 1'01'
temporary illimollY, child support, and suit money.
Charles invokes the rule that temporary alimony canllot \)('
granted unless there is evidence of an existing marriage (Rerves
v. Reeves, 34 Ca1.2d 355, 361 [209 P.2d 937] ; Colbert v. Colbert, 28 Cal.2d 276, 279 l169 P .2d 633]) and the rule that
alimony canllot be granted after a marriage has been dissolved in this state by a court that had jurisdiction over both
spouses. (Long v. LOllg, 17 Cal.2.d 409, 410 [110 P.2d 3831 ;
Tolle v. Superior Court, 10 Ca1.2cl 95, 97-98 [73 P.2d 607l;
Hudson v. H1tdson, 52 Ca1.2d 735, 744 [344 P.2d 295].) lIe
contends that these rules are controlling here, since Doris
attacks only the property provisions of the decree and does
not attack the final divorce.
It is true in the present case that the marriage no longer
exists. The cases requiring marriage as a prerequisite for
alimony and those denying alimony after a final decree of
divorce did not involve a dispute over the validity of the
property provisions of a divorce decree. In Reeves v. Reeves.
34 Cal.2d 355 [209 P.2d 937], and Colbert v. Colbert, 28 Cal.
2d 276 [169 P.2d 633], the question was whether an action
in which alimony was requested for the first time is barred
when there is no existing marriage. In LOllg v. Long, 17 Cal.
2d 409 [110 P.2d 383], and Tolle v. Superior Court, 10 Ca1.2d
95 [73 P.2d 607], the question was whether new actions for
alimony can be maintained subsequent to undisputed decrees
settling property and support rights. There is no merit in
the contention that Hull v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.2d 139,
145 [5 Cal.Rptr. 1, 352 P.2d 161], overruled these cases. In
Hull we merely held that entry of the final decree could not be
refused because the husband had not fulfilled his obligations
under an integrated property settlement incorporated in the
interlocutory decree.
[1] Temporary alimony and suit money may be granted,
however, "[ dl uring the pendency of any action for divorce
or for separate maintenance" (Civ. Code, §§ 137.2 and 137.3),
and the crucial question in this case is whether an action for
divorce is pending within the meaning of those sections. The
quoted language was taken from former Civil Code section
137. "It was settled under section 137 that the phrase therein, 'when an action for divorce is pending',' embraced many
diverse proceedings growing out of the divorce action and
arising after entry of the final decree." (IJerner v. Superior
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Court,38 Ca1.2d 676, 683 [242 P.2d 321].) Temporary relief
has been allowed under seetions 137,2 and 137.3 in numerous
cases in whieh a former spouse has sought to have a decree
interpreted, modified, or enforced even though the marriage
has been dissolved. Thus, in Lerner v. Superior Cotlrt, 38
Ca1.2d 676, 685·686 [242 P.2d 321], temporary relief was
granted after divorce in a proceeding growing out of a motion
for modification of the child custody provisions of the divorce
decree, Temporary relief has been granted in a proceeding
to modify the alimony provisions of a divorce decree (Lamborn
v, LambOl'II, 190 Cal. 794, 795-796 [214 p, 862]); and has
been granted where the court did 110t have jurisdiction to
modify the decree, but was merely interpretin!! or enforcing it,
(Kahn v, Kahn, 95 Cal.App.2d 722, 723 [214 P.2d 80],) It
has also been granted w11(,1'e the wife sought a writ of man·
date to hayc judgment entered for a defil'ieney in alimony
payments (Parker Y. PaI'ker. 22 C'al.App,2d 139, 141·1-12 [70
P.2d 10031) ; and where the relief sought was vacation of the
entire divorce decree. (Grannis v. Superior Court, 143 CaL
630,632.633 [77 P. 647J ; Fisher v. Superior Court, 110 Cal.
App. 565, 566·567 [294 P. 445].) Since the present proceeding is also an attack 011 the dh'orce decree, temporary relief
may likewise be granted under sections 137.2 and 137.3, and
it is immaterial that the decrce is attneked only with respect
to its propert~r provisiolls. It is also immaterial that the attack is by an independent action rather than by a motion in
the divorce proceedings. (Foy v. Foy, 23 Cal.App.2d 543,
546 [73 P.2d 618].)
Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue.

Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J.,
and Dooling, J., concurred.

